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WHY THINGS BITE BACK: TECHNOLOGY AND THE REVENGE OF UNIN-

by Edward Tenner. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1996. 346 Pp. $26.00.
TENDED CONSEQUENCES,

Historian of science Edward Tenner begins his book with a typical example of what he sees as the irony of modern life in a technological society. With the advent of electronic mail and inter-office
networking, one would expect that the amount of paper used in
offices would markedly decline, but in fact, notes Tenner, paper
recycling bins are more full than ever before. People do indeed
communicate through e-mail, but since they mistrust the permanence of electronic transmissions, they also back them up with an
ever increasing amount of paper communication. In his typically
amusing way, Tenner notes that when the office supply stores Office Max and Staples opened up in his hometown of Princeton,
their most sought after products were not computers or software,
but five-thousand-sheet cases of paper for photocopiers, laser printers, and fax machines. (p. ix).
This story is but one of hundreds which Tenner employs to illustrate the central point of his book, which is that in areas as diverse as medicine, the environment, the office, and the world of
sports, technological advances more often than not bring unintended and unforeseen negative consequences. (p. xi). Technology often transforms, rather than eradicates risk. (p. 5-6).
Technological advances have frequently been successful in solving
catastrophic risks but have caused more subtle, chronic problems
that are both more difficult to predict and more challenging to
solve. In the area of medicine, for example, advances such as vaccines and surgical techniques have allowed doctors to prevent and
treat countless catastrophic illnesses, (p.2 6 -4 6 ) but have also resulted in a dramatic increase in chronic ailments, such as mental
illness and other elusive, polymorphous, and open-ended maladies.
(p. 47). Despite this ubiquitous phenomenon, however, Tenner is
not a pessimist. Though he recognizes that technological change
is never costless, he does not advocate against change. Instead, he
argues for a modest, tentative, and skeptical acceptance of it. (p.
xi). He argues that the chronic and subtle problems brought
about by technology demand that we as a society become more

vigilant in protecting ourselves. (pp. xi, 46, 94, 101).

1997]

BOOK REVIEW

Tenner illustrates his thesis with numerous examples from the
area of environmental protection. As in the field of medicine,
technology has often converted catastrophes into chronic conditions. (p. 72). This is particularly true in energy-related environmental regulations and activities. For example, Tenner documents
the unintended effect of federal and state clean air regulations
which set local pollution standards and caused polluters to build
tall smoke stacks (some nearly as large as the Empire State Building) that simply exported pollution to nearby regions. (p. 86). A
number of Tenner's examples come from the sea. He discusses
the various revenge effects caused by the cleanup of the Exxon
Valdez disaster, noting, for example, that high-velocity hot water
treatments scalded the beach and killed many organisms that had
survived the original spill. (p. 90). Tenner also describes the unintended consequences of releasing animals saved from the spill back
into the wild, pointing out that the two-hundred sea otters which
veterinarians rescued and sent back to sea spread a herpes virus to
otters living far beyond the reach of the spill. (p. 91). Beyond the
specific energy context, Tenner argues that the general reduction
of ocean pollution which has occurred over the last century has
allowed pests such as the two-foot long shipworm and the pesky
zebra mussel to thrive, causing billions of dollars of property damage as well as threatening other marine species. (pp. 98-100). Tenner's point is not that cleanup crews should have not cleaned up
the Valdez spill or that efforts to clean the oceans should be halted.
Rather, his point is simply to demonstrate that one can never predict the result when man seeks to use technology to manage the
environment. (pp. 91, 271).
Tenner's book is written for a popular audience, and it is both
engaging and entertaining. In an era of nearly unbounded optimism about the possibilities of technology, Tenner has certainly
succeeded in communicating a sense of skepticism about technological progress without leaving the reader in a state of despair.
Instead, one comes out of the experience of reading Why Things
Bite Back a little less serious about the possibilities of rationality and
a little more impressed with the complexity of nature.
However, it is unfortunate that Tenner does not distinguish between unintended consequences that arise out of human shortsightedness and those that arise out of the impenetrability of
natural systems. After all, there is quite an important difference
between the smokestack example and the shipworm example. In
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the case of the smokestacks, it is certainly possible to argue that
regulators should have and could have foreseen the consequences
of building larger stacks. On the other hand, probably no one
would argue that anyone should have foreseen the rise of shipworms as a result of clean water policy, and if anyone is willing to
make this argument, they assuredly would not also argue that clean
water policy should have been changed as a result. When Tenner
argues that the advent of puncture-resistant tubeless automobile
tires unexpectedly caused the spread of the Asian tiger mosquito, a
carrier of dengue fever which lives in the tires, (p. 271), he is
describing an unintended consequence that nobody could have
predicted. But when he describes the negative effects of DDT on
human health and the environment, (pp. 107-109), he is describing an unintended consequence that at least some would argue
should have been foreseen.
Tenner is not writing about regulatory policy or environmental
law, but his work does have broad relevance for assessing important
issues central to these fields. Unfortunately, Tenner's failure to
clearly distinguish between consequences that humans can and
cannot predict greatly clouds the effect of Tenner's findings on the
legal controversy that is most closely related to his discussion.
Although scholars and legislators have criticized current regulatory policy in the United States for a variety of reasons,I one of the
recurring critiques of the administrative state is that it fails to account for countervailing risks.2 Critics who take this position argue
1. For scholars critical of the administrative state, see

STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE

Vicious CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIrE RISK MANAGEMENT 10-29 (1993) (criticizing administra-

tive agencies for their tunnel vision, random agenda selection, and inconsistency); Daniel
Fiorino, EnvironmentalRisk and Democratic Process: A CriticalReview, 14 COLUM. J. ENM-rL L.
501, 501-02 (1989) (noting the undemocratic nature of administrative regulation); Cass R.
Sunstein, Legislative Forward: Congress, ConstitutionalMoments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48
STAN L. Ray. 247, 260-61 (1996) (criticizing agencies for being too rigid and arguing that
government should favor flexible, market-based incentives rather than rigid commands).
Legislators have also been critical. The 104th Congress considered several proposals that
would have amended the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551-559 (1996), to require cost-benefit analysis and increased judicial review of agency actions. See, e.g., S. 291,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 343, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995). For an excellent summary of the 104th Congress debate over regulatory reform, see Sunstein, supra, at 274-82.
2. See e.g., Risk Versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment 10
(John D. Graham &Jonathan Baert Wiener, eds. 1995) ([W]e suspect that risk tradeoffs
are quietly hindering the effectiveness of the national campaign to reduce risk. The campaign to reduce target risks may in effect be at war with itself: it may be clearing away target
risks but cultivating a new crop of countervailing risks.); BREYER, supra note 1, at 23 ([TI he
regulation of small risks can produce inconsistent results, for it can cause more harm to
health than it prevents.); Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHi. L. REv. 1533,
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that regulatory agencies, guided by imprecise Congressional statutes and uncontrolled by deferential courts, consistently implement regulations that cause more harm than good.' As a solution
to this problem, scholars have argued that agencies should formally consider countervailing risks when making and enforcing
rules, and that they should only take actions that will decrease overall risk. 4 This argument assumes that agencies, and human beings
more generally, are able to accurately identify relevant countervailing risks and weigh them against potential benefits in order to
determine whether they should take some particular regulatory
action.
Although it is somewhat unclear whether Tenner's book
strengthens these arguments or renders them unpersuasive, it ultimately should make us think twice about the possibilities of any
improved risk tradeoff assessment program. On the one hand,
Tenner's observations, particularly those of the smokestack and
DDT variety, suggest that regulatory policies do often overlook potentially identifiable countervailing risks. But Tenner's argument
is deeper than this. At bottom, Tenner suggests a deep skepticism
about the possibility of understanding or predicting the complex
consequences that arise out of mans interaction with nature. Tenner is no pessimist, and his call to vigilance does indicate that he
thinks some of nature's unintended consequences can be predicted and avoided. This suggests that at some level, agencies
should be able to identify large and easily observable countervailing risks and adjust their risk assessment policies accordingly.
Nevertheless, the basic thrust of Why Things Bite Back is that the
ability of human beings to predict the results of their actions is
profoundly limited. This suggests that even the best efforts of
agencies to foresee the results of regulatory policy will fail to anticipate the endless variety of unintended consequences which materialize whenever human beings seek to protect themselves from risk.
Jay D. Wexler
1535 (1996) (My purpose in this Essay is to discuss a pervasive problem in risk regulation
The problem occurs when the diminution of one health risk simultaneously increases another

...

health risk.).

3. See., e.g., Sunstein, supranote 2, at 1537 (arguing that, in order to begin solving the
risk tradeoff problem, agencies should consider countervailing risks, Congress should
amend the APA to require agencies to consider them, and the judiciary should review
agency decisions more closely).
4. See, e.g., Risk Versus Risk, supranote 2, at 252-56 (urging agencies to make formal
risk tradeoff analyses when determining regulatory policy).

